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• 
• Standard cost variances are commonly used to highlight operational strengths 
and problems , and their presence may be an indicator of fraud . 
CECILY RAIBORN , JANET B . BUTLER, AND LUCIAN ZELAZNY 
11 organizations, regard-
less of size or activity, are 
vulnerable to fraud. How-
ever, manufacturing firms 
seem to be particularly 
vulnerable; a 2010 global survey of com-
panies operating in more than 20 indus-
tries found that the manufacturing 
industry had 10.7 percent ofal! reported 
fraud cases, making it the second high-
est on the list. 1 Equally serious is the 
financial impact of these frau d cases. 
Manufacturers reported a median cost of 
$300,000 per reported incident, an 
amount nearly 90 percent higher than 
the median for all companies surveyed. 
Despite the fact that organizations 
institute a wide variety of internal con-
trols to deter and detect fraudulent activ-
ities, approximately 40 percent of fraud 
is initially detected through tips from 
stakeholders such as employees, cus-
tomers, and vendors .2 Unfortunately, the 
likelihood that a stakeholder will report 
fraud is reduced by factors such as per-
sonal job security concerns and/or 
whether management is involved in the 
fraudulent scheme .3 Given t hat manu-
facturing has been significantly impacted 
by layoffs and economic downturns, 
internal tipsters may be less likely to 
come forwa rd because of concerns about 
continued employment. Most manufac-
turers , though, have an important report-
ing tool that can help them detect fraud 
without the use of whistleblower tips: 
the standard cost variance . Standard cost 
variances are commonly used to highlight 
operational strengths and problems , but 
the se reporting mechanisms can also 
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serve as useful "red flag" indicators to help 
manufact urers identify fraud. 
This article focuses on how standard 
cost variances can be used in detecting 
potential fraudulent activities . Each pri-
mary type of variance (material, labor, 
and overhead) is addressed with a dis-
cussion of possible inappropriate causal 
factors . Additionally, internal controls, 
graphic techniques, and other methods 
that can be implemented to combat fraud 
are provided . 
Internal controls, standards, 
and variance analysis 
An internal control (IC) is any organi-
zational process used "to provide rea -
sonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the fol-
lowing categories: 
reliability of financial reporting; 
effectiveness and efficiency of oper-
ations; and 
compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations"4 
The three basic classifications of ICs 
are preventive, detective, and corrective. 
A preventive control is focused on pre-
cluding either the occurrence of a spe-
cific error or irregularity or the 
nonoccurrence of a specific control objec-
tive. In contrast, a detective control iden-
tifies errors, irregularities, or unachieved 
control objectives after an undesired 
event occurs; the inappropriate actions 
may have either eluded, or were not the 
focus of, the preventive controls. In other 
words, detective controls draw attention 
to - but do not correct - a problem. A 
corrective control is designed to help a 
firm recover from undesirable or unau-
thorized activities. 
F.inancial and operational planning 
requires estimates about future prices 
and usage of inputs. Standards specify 
expected costs and/or quantities for man-
ufacturing a single unit of product or 
performing a single service. Managers 
commonly use standards to estimate 
future quantity requirements to help 
determine purchasing needs for mater-
ial, staffing needs for labor, overhead 
capacity, and company cash flows. Stan-
dards also express the expected price to 
STANDARD COST VARIANCES 
be paid for material, rate to be paid to labor 
personnel, and amount to be incurred 
relative to variable and fixed overhead. 
An important benefit of standard costs 
is having norms against which actual 
operating activities can be compared, so 
that managers are able to assess opera-
tional effectiveness and efficiency. A well -
designed variance analysis system will 
compute variances as early as possible 
so managers can moni tor operations, 
detect deviations from the norm, ascer-
tain variance causes, and take any nec-
essary corrective actions. As with all 
business processes, the variance system 
is subject to cost-benefit constraints . 
Because undue investigations are expen-
sive and inefficienV supervisors often 
employ the management - by-exception 
principle to distinguish between situa-
tions that can be ignored and those that 
need attention . To implement management 
by exception, upper and lower tolerance 
limits of acceptable deviations from the 
standard are established. If a variance is 
outside of the tolerance limit, the vari-
ance should be investigated and its cause 
ascertained. Variance causality can be 
determined through observation, inspec-
tion, and inquiry. Management should 
then take action to eliminate unfavor-
able variances (or, on occasion, to con-
tinue favorable variances into the future). 
Although managerial action is gener-
ally not required if variances are within 
an acceptable range, upper management 
should be aware of ongoing trends in 
variances. A consistent, albeit small, vari-
ance might indicate the beginning of a major 
problem. Additionally, variances are often 
interrelated and, therefore , cannot be 
analyzed in isolation from one another. 
For example, poor quality material may 
result in a favorable material price vari-
ance and an offsetting unfavorable labor 
efficiency variance. Minimizing total unit 
cost does not necessarily mean, given 
desired output quality standards, that the 
cost of each p ~oduct or service input 
component should - or can - be min-
imized. Some possible input resource 
combinations are not necessarily practi-
calor efficient. For instance, using low-
tech equipment to minimize overhead 
depreciation charges may not be rea-
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sonable in the manufacturing of high-
tech products. 
Variance analysis and internal control 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organi-
zations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) 6 stated that an effective inter-
nal control structure has five components: 
the control environment, risk assess-
ment, control activities, information 
and communicat ion, and monitoring. 
Each component can be viewed with 
regard to a standard costing system or 
variance analysis. 
Control environment. The control envi-
ronment encompasses business actions, 
policies , managerial philosophies, and 
operating styles; it also creates an atmos-
phere within which internal controls 
exist. This atmosphere can enhance or 
hinder the effectiveness of rcs that have 
been developed for the organization. 
Implementation of a standard costing 
system indicates that management rec-
ognizes the importance of having bench-
marks against which to measure actual 
outcomes. The level (expected, practical, 
or ideal) at which standards are set reOects 
the degree of commitment that man-
agement has to cost control, along with 
management's tolerance for deviations. 
When standards are set at the expected 
level, cost control is fairly lax and most 
outcomes will be within tolerance ranges. 
In contrast, ideal standards reflect excep-
tionally tight cost control but will poten-
tially result in large unfavorable 
deviations . 
Risk assessment. Companies face IDany 
risks, and an effective IC structure will 
support assessment, analysis, and man-
agement of these risks. Neither a stan-
dard cost system nor variance analysis 
can help a firm predict future risks, but 
the standard setting process can force 
an examination of future market and 
labor conditions that may provide impor-
tant information for the risk assessment 
process. Standard cost systems can also 
he lp in identifying the realization of 
some types of risk by highl ighting when 
standards have not been met. 
Control activities. Control activities 
are reflected in the policies and proce-
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dures used bya firm to ensure that man-
agement's wishes are accomplished. In gen-
eral, a standard costing system's primary 
objective is cost control. As such, stan-
dard costing control activities include 
supervisory approvals or authorizations 
for purchases, materials issuances, labor 
rates, and contract commitments for 
fixed overhead costs. Consideration 
should be given to factors such as mate-
rial quality, normal material-ordering 
quantities, expected employee wage rates, 
mix of employee skills, facility layout, and 
expected degree of plant automation. 
The entire variance analysis process is 
a control activity that supports opera-
tiona l and compliance objectives. 
Information and communication. The 
control activities are facilitated by infor-
mation and communicat ion within an 
organization. The sharing of informa-
tion helps when conducting and man-
aging business operations, and it 
enhances the effectiveness of control 
activities. In the case of standard costs, 
information is communicated to appro-
priate parties throughout the organi-
zational hierarchy so that all will know 
the basis on which performance evalu-
ations will be made. Further, including 
various organizational areas (such as 
cost accounting, industrial engineer-
ing, human resources, and purchasing) 
when standards are developed helps to 
ensure their credibility. However, even 
with the most knowledgeable input, 
there will likely be variances between the 
standard and actual prices and quanti-
ties during any period. The materiality 
and assessme nt (favorable or unfavor-
able) of those variallCes will , as mentioned 
earlier, be linked to the level at which 
the standards are set. 
Monitoring. Monitoring is an essen-
tial part of the IC framework and 
ensures that the control activities 
have been instituted, are function-
ing properly, and are up to date. In a 
standard cost system, monitoring 
occurs through the comparisons of 
actual and standard information made 
to ascertain operational effectiveness 
and efficiency. In addition, moni-
toring should be viewed as an ongo-
ing process, and, relative to standards, 
STANDARD COST VARIANCES 
'-.. 
EXHIBIT 1 Summary of Variances as Fraud Indicators '\ 
Va.riance Name Formula Red FlaCl Indicator of Fraud 
Material Price (Actual Price - Budgeted Price) Unfavorable Variance 
Variance (MPV) x • Vendor kickbacks 
Actual Quantity o Change to vendor with higher prices 
o Purchase of higher than 
specified material grade 
Favorable Variance 
• Vendor kickbacks 
o Larger than normal reorder 
quantities 
o Lower than specified material grade 
Material Usage (Actual Quantity - Budgeted Unfavorable Variance 
Variance (MUV) Quantity Allowed for Actual Output) • I nventory Theft 
x • Lower grade material was 
Budgeted Price received than was ordered 
Labor Rate (Actual Rate - Budgeted Rate) Unfavorable Variance 
Variance (LRV) x • "Out of the norm" labor rates for 
Actual Hours certain employees (real or ghost) 
Labor Efficiency (Actual Hours - Budgeted Quantity Unfavorable Variance 
Variance (LEV) Allowed for Actual Output) • Employees overstating or "padding" 
x hours worked 
Budgeted Price • Presence of ghost employee 
Variable Overhead (Actual Variable Overhead per unit - Unfavorable Variance 
(VOH) Spending Budgeted Variable Overhead per unit) • Theft of supplies 
Variance x • Fraudulent overtime 
Actual Quantity of cost allocation base Favorable Variance 
• VOH expenses inappropriately 
capitalized in non-inventory accounts 
Fixed Overhead Actual Costs - Budgeted Costs Unfavorable Variance 
(FOH) Spending • Ghost supervisory employee 
Variance 
• Inflated payments made to related 
party (conflict of interest scheme) 
or to gain kickback 
Favorable Variance 
• Asset salvage value increased and 
depreciation reduced 
• Asset life extended beyond the norm 
and depreciation reduced 
• FOH expenditures inappropriately 
capitalized 
Note: Standard prices, rates, quantities, or times may be inflated to game the system, leading to favorable variances. 
i t is reflected in the r eview and updat-
ing of standards to reflect changes in 
costs, quantities, and facilities . 
The standard costing and variance 
analysis system is an Ie too l that can 
help ensure operationa l efficacy and pro-
mote communicat ion of expectatio n s. 
In addition to these benefits, t he system 
can be used to help management "iden-
tify areas of particular susceptibility [to 
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fraud] among employees in production, 
operations and administration."7 
Variances as fraud symptoms 
In the process of evaluating who or what 
was respons ible for each variance, man-
agers should be aware that variances 
(either unfavorable or favorable) can 
reflect both legitimate and illegitimate 
causal circumstances . Unfavorable vari-
ances occur when operations are less than 
the budgeted standards: Prices are higher 
or performance is lower than the standard. 
These variances cause operating income 
to decrease. Favorable variances reflect ' 
operations that are better than budgeted; 
as a result, operating income is increased. 
Both unfavorable and favorable variances 
for material, labor, and overhead may be 
red flag indicators of fraudulent activi-
ties (as presented in Exhibit 1) . The fol-
lowing discussion focuses on recognizing 
the possibility that significant or ongo-
ing standard cost variances could be 
symptomatic of organizational fraud. 
Unfavorable variances 
as indicators of fraud 
Ma t er i al . Because alternative material 
inputs can generally be used to generate 
similar output and output quality, the 
input choices that are made affect the 
price and quantity standards that are set. 
The choices result in trade-offs for mate-
rial mix and yield, finished product qual-
ity, overall product cost, and product 
salabilit y. The most common factor to 
explain a material price variance (MPV) 
is simply an increase or a decrease in unit 
cost; such a price change should be ver-
ifiable by investigating comparative mar-
ket prices around the economic 
environment in which the purchases are 
being made . 
Manufacturers need to be alert to the 
possibility of vendor kickbacks to purchasing 
agents and operations personnel when 
monitoring material p r ices and usage. A 
higher than expected price can result from 
payments to influence the vendor selec-
tion and/or the ordering process; a pos-
sible red flag indicator will be higher 
prices in conjunction with a vendor change. 
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Another possibility that would create an 
unfavorable MPV is the purchase of a 
higher-grade material than that desig-
nated in the bill of materials. Although the 
primary cause (different grade material) 
might be identifiable, there is still a ques-
tion as to the fundamental reason for such 
a purchase. Such purchases may be made 
because the designated grade of material 
may be unavailable. However, such pur-
chases may also be made because of ven -
dor kickbacks being made for purchasing 
the higher-grade material. 
Large purchase orders, coupled with 
a significant unfavorable material usage 
(quantity) variance (MUV), could indi-
cate inventory theft via collusion between 
the purchasing and receiving or delivery 
departments; materials delivery may be 
made to an unauthorized location for 
the benefit of the purchasing agent or 
another employee . Unfavorable MUVs 
may also arise without regard to mate-
rial price variances. Such variances could 
result from inventory theft or from a 
vendor shipping a lower-grade material 
than ordered and continuing to charge 
the standard material price. 
Labo r. Labor rate standards should 
reflect employee wages and related 
employer costs for fringe benefits, FICA 
(Social Securit y), and unemployment 
taxes. In the simplest situation, all depart-
mental personnel are paid the same wage 
rate as, for example, when wages are task 
specific or tied to a labor contract. If 
emp loyees performing the same or sim-
ilar tasks are paid different wage rates, 
a weighted average rate (total wage cost 
per hour divided by the number of work-
ers) must be computed and used as the 
standard . Rate differences could be caused 
by length of employment or skill level. 
The labor ra te variance (LRV) is the 
difference between the actua l wages paid 
to labor for the pe ri od and the standard 
cost of ac t ual hours worked. Changing 
a payroll rate would genera lly require 
collusion between the hourly employee 
and someone in the payroll area. In large 
organizations, this circumstance woul d 
be unlikely due to the ability of large 
firms to segregate duties among many 
employees and to protect sensitive data 
files from unauthorized access; however, 
STANDARD COST VARIANCES 
it could occur in smaller organizations . 
In attempting to find fraud related to 
LRVs, an analysis shou ld be run that 
highlights all "out of the norm" labor 
rates - which might be quite noticeable 
if union contracts are in effect. Trend 
analysis would indicate whether employ-
ees with higher rates are under the super-
vision of the same manager. 
In contrast, the labor efficiency vari-
ance (LEV) indicates whether the amount 
of time worked was less or more than the 
standard quantity allowed for the actual 
output. Several potential fraudulent sce-
narios exist relative to unfavorable LEV s. 
Employees may be overstating or "padding" 
the number of hours worked. While there 
is a wide range of ways for employees to 
record their hours, there are two likely pos-
sibilities: Either the employee simply fal-
sifies his/her timesheet and the supervisor 
is unaware of the discrepancy, or there is 
collusion with a supervisor to approve 
additional time. 
An unfavorable LEV may also indi-
cate the possibility of one or more ghost 
employees on the payroll. Ghost employ-
ees receive paychecks but provide no 
productivity; thus, labor efficiency would 
be below that which was expected. The 
perpetrator of a ghost employee scheme 
is likely to be either a supervisor who has 
not communicated an employee's depar-
ture or dismissal to the payroll depart-
ment or a payroll employee who has not 
deleted a former employee from the sys-
tem (or has simply"created" a ghost and 
placed him/her on the payroll) . If the 
ghost is a former employee, the perpe-
trator is likely in collusion with that 
individual- unless the perpetrator has 
the ability to obtain and cash/deposit 
the ghost's paycheck . 
Var i ab l e ov erhead . Variable overhead 
(VOH) covers a range of cost elements 
and fluctuates in a direct relationship 
with some designated level of activity 
(such as direct labor or machine hours) . 
It is impossible to investigate for fraud 
using the total VOH spending or effi-
ciency variance; variances in each cost 
element must be analyzed separately. 
VOH spending variances are caused by 
both component price and volume dif-
ferences. VOH spending variances are 
STANDARD COST VARIANCES 
often associated with price differences 
that have not been properly included in 
the standard rate; however, potential 
fraud causes of indirect material and 
indirect labor variances may also exist 
(and reflect scenarios similar to those of 
direct material and direct labor). Waste 
or shrinkage of production inputs (such 
as indirect material) is included in the 
VOH spending variance; such a category 
might be a prime location to hide sup-
plies theft. In addition, an indirect labor 
variance that could be attributed to fraud 
is overtime - ei ther relative to rates or 
hours - which may reflect collusion 
between an employee and payroll personnel 
or a supervisor; such a circumstance 
might be highlighted by running an 
exception report for employees who have 
received an excessive amount of overtime 
in a given period. Many of the other VOH 
cost categories reflect prices charged by 
external parties and, as such, would have 
limited potential for fraud. 
The VOH efficiency variance quanti-
fies the effect of using more or less of the 
activity or resource that is the base for 
VOH application. Thus, if VOH is applied 
on a direct labor hour basis, the VOH 
efficiency variance will track in tandem 
with a labor efficiency variance and is the 
result of the causal direct labor factors. 
Fixed ove rh e ad. As with variable over-
head, fixed overhead (FOH) is comprised 
of numerous cost elements including pro-
duction and supervisory salaries, straight-
line depreciation on factory assets, factory 
insurance, and the fixed portion of mixed 
factory costs (such as utilities and Ipain-
tenance). The FOH spending variance 
represents the differences between bud-
geted and actual costs for the numerous 
FOH components, although it can also 
reflect resource mismanagement. As with 
VOH variances, individual spending vari-
ances should be calculated for each FOH 
component. An unfavorable spending 
variance fo~ salaries could reflect ghost 
supervisory employees on the payroll. 
Favorable variances 
as indicators of fraud 
Favorable variances, because they increase 
income, are sometimes not investigated 
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as carefully as unfavorable variances 
because manufacturers are more concerned 
with eliminating process inefficiencies; 
however, some favorable variances may 
signal fraud. For example, a favorable 
MPV may arise if materials are being pur-
chased in larger-than-normal reorder 
quantities as a result of a vendor kick-
back scheme. A favorable MPV would 
also be the result of buying a lower-
than-specified grade of material. This 
situation might occur because of a lack 
in availability of the designated grade, 
but kickbacks could also be a factor. In 
this circumstance, it is useful to review 
the MPV in conjunction with the MUV. 
Commonly, using lower-grade materi-
als results in an unfavorable MUV and 
possibly an unfavorable LEV due to the 
necessity for rework. Capitalizing vari-
able or fixed overhead expenses in non-
inventory accounts would reduce actual 
overhead cost and create favorable VOH 
or FOH spending variance. Maintenance 
costs have often been capitalized in fraud 
situations, such as Rent- Way Inc. 8 A sig-
nificant decline in the depreciation 
expense during a period should be inves-
tigated to determine if asset salvage val-
ues have been increased, or if asset lives 
have been extended beyond the norm; 
such techniques were heavily used in the 
waste management fraud case. 9 
Today's emphasis on performance-
based compensation can create a pow-
erful incentive for managers to inflate 
standard prices/rates or quantities/times 
- either throug h gaining access to data 
files or by influencing the standard set-
ting process so as to "game the system." 
Inflated standards can make actual per-
formance appear more positive. Inap-
propriate influence could arise, for 
example, by including an excessively 
high waste factor in the material quan-
tity standards or downtimelrework fac-
tor in the labor time standard while 
knowing that such m isuse or delay is 
unlike ly to occur. Additionally, if over-
head standards are inflated, year-end 
results will generate an overapplied over-
head balance that, when written off as a 
negative adjustment to cost of goods 
sold, can suddenly make income meet 
or exceed expected targets. 
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Combating fraud: A combination of 
low-tech and high-tech approaches 
Companies should employ a variety of 
high-tech and low-tech methods to com-
bat fraud. "Tried and true" methods to 
prevent and detect material-related fraud 
include implementation of policies about 
vendor diversification, partnership 
alliances, and primary/sole sourcing 
relationships. Trends relative to pur-
chases from a particular supplier should 
be analyzed, especially in conjunction with 
ongoing orders from a particular pur-
chasing agent. The materials market 
should be monitored periodically to 
ascertain that prices being paid are com-
petitive . Lastly, if material quantity vari-
ances are becoming more noticeable, the 
material flow from the vendor to the 
shop floor may need to be traced by using 
physical flow information, bar coding, 
or RFID tags to determine if "bad" out -
put is related to poor quality material 
input from a particular vendor. 
The most effective deterrent to other 
types of fraud requires minimizing the 
opportunity to manipulate wage rates, stan-
dards, and overhead. Reports should be 
generated that highlight period-to-period 
wage adjustments, especially those made 
outside of the normal raise timeframes 
(such as quarterly or annually). Such 
reports can also indicate employees whose 
hours worked are considered "excessive" 
as defined by the organization in rela -
tionship to a normal workweek, although 
this would possibly adjusted for seasonal 
variations or rush jobs. Standards files 
should be password protected, and access 
should be limited to employees with the 
authority to change standards. For both 
labor rate and time standards changes, 
the employee's supervisor should be 
alerted to note any variance patterns and 
ascertain the sources of those variations. 
Procedures to assess the possibility of ghost 
employees are well established and 
include the following: 
independent corroboration between 
human resource and payroll 
departments of current employees; 
review of payroll records for 
employees lacking Social Security 
numbers; 
STANDARD COST VARIANCES 
EXHIBIT 2 Data Mining for Fraud (Assumes Ongoing Variances) 
Variance(s) 
Unfavorable material 
variance and 
favorable material 
usage variance 
Unfavorable or 
favorable material 
price variance 
Unfavorable or 
favorable material 
price variance 
Unfavorable material 
usage variance 
Unfavorable labor 
rate variance 
Unfavorable labor 
efficiancy variance 
Unfavorable labor 
efficiancy variance 
Unfavorable variable 
overhead spending 
variance - indirect 
labor 
Unfavorable fixed 
overhead spending 
variance - salaries 
Unfavorable fixed 
overhead spending 
variance - ---~ -----
depreciation 
Data Mined 
Accounts payable and 
material requisitions 
Accounts payable and 
employee records 
Accounts payable and 
employee records 
Material requisitions, 
receiving reports, 
and employee records 
Personnel records and 
wages payable 
Personnel records and 
employee timesheets 
Employee timesheets 
and supervisor records 
Employee times heels 
and overtime rates 
Personnel records and 
employee timesheets 
Asset aquisition 
records and 
depreciation 
calculations 
common deductions (such as insur-
ance premiums or union dues); 
basic data (such as home address , 
phone number, or email); 
direct deposit information 
(although, depending on the organi-
zation and type of employees, lack 
of this information may be com-
mon); and 
cross-referencing duplicate 
employee information . 
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Uncovers 
Purchases made 
from same vendor 
Purchases made from 
same vendor; vendor 
has same address as 
purchasing agent 
Unnaturally 
consecutive invoice 
numbers 
Material requisitioned 
was delivered to 
alternate address 
Same supervisor for 
all overpaid employees 
No timesheets for 
certain employees 
Falsified employee 
timesheets all 
all ocourred under 
same supervisor 
Excessive overtime 
or excessive 
overtime rates paid 
to employees 
A supervisor does not 
exist or is no longer 
with the company 
Asset salvage value 
reduced or asset life 
extended beyong 
the norm 
Type of Fraud 
Kickbacks being 
paid to purchasing agent 
Shell company 
established by 
purchasing agent 
Shell company 
established by 
purchasing agent 
Employee theft 
of materials 
Collusion between 
supervisor and overpaid 
employees 
Ghost employee 
Collusion between 
supervisor and 
"absent" employees 
Collusion between 
employee and payroll 
personnel or manager 
Ghost supervisory 
employee 
Management 
influencing 
performance-based 
compensation 
Variance analysis is helpful in drawing 
attention to certain types of fraud, but it 
can be somewhat limited in the infor-
mation proyided. To supplement the infor-
mation gleaned through variance analysis, 
manufacturers should also leverage loday's 
powerful and flexible technologies to 
detect fraudulent activities. 
Data mining. Data mining is one exam-
ple of a technology that can complement 
variance analysis in detecting fraud. Data 
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EXHIBIT 3 Visual Ana lytics of Purchase Order Numbers 
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nllnlllg explores, aggregates, and ana-
lyzes large amounts of organizational 
data so as to "better understand busi-
ness processes, trends, and opportuni-
ties [and] improve efficiency and 
effectiveness, as well as to discover anom-
alies." 10 Data mining is commonly used 
to discover significant patterns (espe-
cially those that might have been previ-
ously obscured) in the mined information 
- often to predict future behavior. ll 
Therefore, after variance analysis high-
lights differences between actual and 
standard prices and quantities, data min-
ing can be used to filter and sort indi-
vidual transactions to identify similarities 
within the information (or to detect out-
liers that could be used to detect the 
possibility of fraudulent transactions). 
The data mining software is able to check 
relationships among multiple variables 
in multiple fields, so as to indicate implau-
sible or surprising cases." 
For example, a data mining"drill down" 
may ascertain that a large portion of 
transactions causing a material price or 
usage variance share a common charac-
teristic: All of them resulted from mate-
rials purchased from a single vendor. 
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Additional comparative analysis might 
reveal that the vendor shares certain iden-
tifying information (e.g., phone number, 
fax, email, or address) with that of an 
employee - presenting a possibility of 
a pass-through or shell company. A shell 
company may also be a possibility if data 
mining shows that a vendor's invoice 
numbers are more consecutive than would 
naturally occur in a legitimate business . 
Another example of the use of data min-
ing relates to a labor efficiency variance; 
data extraction may indicate that all labor 
inefficiencies occurred during a partic-
ular shift or under a particular shift super-
visor. Additional scrutiny of the data logs 
might show a system override by the 
supervisor that allowed several "employ-
ees" to be added to the payroll records or 
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in per-
sonnel information. Exhibit 2 provides 
some examples of issues that might be 
uncovered after mining different types 
of information and the frauds that might 
be related to those discoveries . 
Visual analytics. Visual an alytics (VA) 
is another tool that can complement vari-
ance analysis in detecting fraud. VA uses 
a computer to create a representation of 
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complex data that is then subjected to 
human visual analysis - taking advan-
tage of a human's ability to visually iden-
tify trends or patterns with which 
computers often struggle . This phe-
nomenon is illustrated by the use of 
CAPTCHA technology to distinguish a 
human from a computer. CAPTCHA 
stands for Completely Automated Pub-
lic Turing test to tell Computers and 
Humans Apart. It is typically imple-
mented by warping the text, distorting 
the background, and adding lines, all in 
order to to make it difficult for auto-
mated routines to identify the text . 
Thus, VA combines automated analy-
sis processes with interactive visualiza-
tions to "enable detection of the expected 
and discovery of the unexpected within 
massive, dynamically changing infor-
mation spaces," says Kris Cook, director 
of the National Visualization and Ana-
lytics Center. 13 Similar to data mining, 
VA can be used to identify connections 
and/or trends within the data that may 
be difficult to discover using traditional 
techniques. For example, as illustrated 
in Exhibit 3, VA may be used to gener-
ate an analysis of purchase orders for 
multiple vendors over several years. The 
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chart highlights purchase orders from 
the same vendor by connecting them 
with a line, which can then be inspected 
for unexpected trends. Purchase order 
numbers that occur out of sequence or 
are repeated are easily identified and 
may indicate a fraudulent purchase order. 
With an online interactive chart, fur-
ther investigation can take place by click-
ing on the purchase order to retrieve the 
details of that transaction. 
Another example of visual analytics 
is a network diagram of vendors and 
addresses, such as the one shown in 
Exhibit 4. In this example, the approved 
vendor list has three vendors at the same 
address with similar names and differ-
ent vendor IDs. While the most likely 
cause of this situation is that vendors 
were entered without thoroughly check-
ing to see if the vendor information was 
already in the system, there is the poten-
tial for the duplicate vendors to be used 
in a kickback scheme, shell company, or 
other type of fraud. Invoices from (and 
payments made to) the duplicate ven-
dors should be investigated. 
Link analysis is another VA tool that 
allows relationships, especially those 
that are hidden in complex networks, to 
be seen in a "web" diagram. Exhibit 5 
provides a link analysis among purchase 
orders, vendors, and standard cost vari-
ances. This diagram indicates that man-
agement may want to investigate why the 
purchasing agent is primarily buying 
materials from a vendor that, although 
selling at below market prices and gen-
erating favorable material price vari-
ances, provides inputs that appear to be 
of inappropriate quality due to the gen-
eration of unfavorable material quan-
tity variances. 
Today's enterprise systems integrate 
all functional areas of an organization to 
capture all aspects of transactions - with 
the data centrally located in one data-
base rather than in disparate systems. 
The ability provided by data mining to eas-
ily "drill down" into transactional details 
helps mitigate risk by allowing the exam-
ination of an entire data population and 
the relationships between and among the 
data (rather than simply reviewing a lim-
ited data sample).14 Additionally, the capa-
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EXHIBIT 5 Link Analysis of Vendors and Variances 
Unfavorable Favorable MPVs MUVs' 5 from Vendor A 38 from Vendor A 30 from Vendor B 94 from Vendor B 10 from Vendor C 15 from Vendor C 90 from Vendor 0 . 
~~;' 
~ r. No MUVs' ; . 
No MPVs 19 from Vendor A 
45 from Vendor A 94 from Vendor B 
50 from Vendor B --- 20 from Vendor C 
10 from Vendor C 
Favorable 
MPVs 
Unfavorable 
MPVs' 
180 from Vendor C 
310 from Vendor 0 
135 from Vendor C 
158 from Vendor 0 
• All material is not issued in the same quantities or the same period as POS. 
bility of visual analytics to expose data's 
"latent knowledge" without any hypothe-
ses about variance causality also provides 
managers with a valuab le too1. 15 Man-
agers no longer have to rely solely on 
judgment to ascertain the meaning behind 
a variance computation; data patterns 
and relationships can be highlighted with 
data mining and VA techniques. 
Conclusion 
A manufacturer (or any othe r organi-
zation) that does not act on situations 
exposed by detective controls (such a.s 
variances) risks losing a substantial 
amount of money.16 Early identification 
of fraud is particularly important because 
once the fraudulent actions have 
"infected" the accounting system , recog-
nition of the problems becomes exceed-
ingly more difficult. For example, if 
standards are inflated in the current 
per iod, those standards will likely serve 
as the basis for analysis until manage-
ment orders a standard costing system 
review. Cost or rate increases may sim-
ply be "ad ded on" to the fictit iously 
inflated standard - generating larger 
favorable variances and the potential for 
even greater bonuses. If ghost employ-
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ees have been placed on the payroll, 
those "employees" will likely remain and 
continue receiving checks until a detailed 
human resource review is performed. 
Ignoring standard cost variances or 
accepting superficial exp lanations for 
those varian ces dramatically minimizes 
the functionality of the detective inter-
nal control p rovide d by variance analy -
sis. Data mining and graphical techniques 
(such as visual analytics) can help explain 
standard cost variances, and they can 
enhance a manager's ab il ity to identify 
problem areas and fraud. Technology 
augments human ingenuity by providing 
users with greater context and depth of 
information. 17 Not leveraging the tools 
availab le to investigate and recognize 
potential fraudulent causes of standard 
costing variances strengthens the oppor-
tunity to commit fraud. 
Variances are often overlooked as fraud 
indicators. One reason that managers 
may not act on suspicious variances is 
that in analyzing standard cost vari-
ances, management commonly tends to 
accept the "easiest" or first explanation 
provided. In doing so, management i.s 
acting in conformity with a version of a 
14th century line of reasoning referred 
to as Occam's razor (principle) or the 
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rule of simplicity. In its most minimal-
ist form, this principle indicates that, 
while many possible explanations may exist 
for an outcome, the simplest reason is often 
the correct one.'8 However, such a "min-
imalist" version is not a complete one: 
Occam's razor actually continues fur-
ther to state that additional circum-
stances should be examined to ascertain 
whether they provide more compelling 
arguments . Therefore, management mus t 
use all techniques at its disposal to delve 
into what might be underlying fraudu-
lent causes for variances. Although def-
initely not the cause of all standard cost 
variances, fraud cannot be ruled out 
unle ss managers seek to discover the real 
causes rather than relying on Occam's 
razor's easy explanations . • 
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